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Resolution of the 'Sea Wars':
Coastal Zone Management Act
Introduction
In the final year of World War II, President Truman issued
a unilateral proclamation' of global significance whereby the
United States essentially claimed jurisdiction over the natural
resources of the adjacent Outer Continental Shelf (OCS).2 It was
a farsighted and unique declaration based on a practical need to
develop new sources of oil and to establish control over those
resources to further conservation and prudent utilization.3 How-
ever, the Truman Proclamation dealt with the sovereignty of the
United States over OCS resources solely in the international
context. More than a decade passed before domestic policy
makers determined the roles federal and state governments were
to play in the development of the OCS. The federal/state rela-
tionship which evolved has been characterized by Congress as a
"partnership," ' 4 although it is more accurate to describe the state
and federal governments as adversaries in a "sea war." 5
The Government of the United States regards "the natural resources of the
subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas, but contiguous to the
coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction
and control." Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945).
2 The OCS encompasses all submerged lands under United States jurisdiction lying
seaward of the three-mile territorial sea granted to the states under the Submerged Lands
Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a)(2), 1331(a) (1982).
See generally Jones, The Development of Outer Continental Shelf Energy Re-
sources, I l PEPPERDINE L. REv. 9 (1983) (comprehensive description of the development
of OCS).
4 See 130 CONG. REC. S1506 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1984) (statement of Sen. Pack-
wood); see also Note, Federal "Consistency" Under the Coastal Zone Management Act
- A Promise Broken by Secretary of the Interior v. California, 15 ENVT'L L. 153, 169-
70 (Fall '84) (Justice O'Connor's interpretation of § 307(c)(1) could hinder state-federal
cooperation).
Goldstein, Conclusion: Landlords of the Sea, in THE POLITICS OF OFFSHORE OIL
179 (J. Goldstein ed. 1982).
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The source of this intergovernmental tension is contained in
the conflicting purposes of two federal statutes governing the
OCS. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments
6
authorize the federal government to issue oil and gas leases in
the OCS, while the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)
7
authorizes the states to protect the environmental balance of the
coastal zone.
8
The controversy between energy development and environ-
mental concerns culminated in a recent Supreme Court decision
interpreting the state mandated consistency provisions of the
CZMA. 9 The 5-4 decision in Secretary of the Interior v. Cali-
fornia, reflecting the federal government's position, served to
escalate rather than resolve the conflict. The ramifications of
this decision were reflected in the increase in the number of
leases placed in moratoria and in adjustments to the Department
of Interior's (Interior) leasing policy. Other federal programs on
the OCS, such as hazardous waste dumping, fishery management
plans, regulation of coastal pollution and siting of energy facil-
ities were negatively impacted as a result of the Supreme Court's
construction. I0 In addition, the Court's decision increased public
interest in the CZMA's reauthorization in 198511 and stimulated
both Houses of Congress to propose amendments to the CZMA.
43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1982).
7 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1982).
The coastal zone is defined by the CZMA as the coastal waters extending
seaward to the outer limits of the "territorial" sea and the adjacent shorelands. 16
U.S.C. § 1453(1) (1982).
Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984).
See 130 CoNG. REc. S1506 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood).
H.R. 6979, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4362 (it appears from the legislative history contained in this report that the CZMA
will be considered for reauthorization in 1988); see 16 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982) (the
last authorization period for appropriations ran from Oct. 1, 1980 to Sept. 30, 1985);
130 CONG. REc. E1592 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1985) (remarks of Rep. Shumway) (the
House proposal for reauthorization planned to reduce federal grants from 8007o of costs
for, funding CZMA plans to 20% over a four year period); 130 CoNG. REG. S4413,
S4414 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1985) (remarks of Sen. Danforth and Sen Hollings) (the Senate
proposal calls for freezing appropriations for 1986 at the current funding level and
allowing a 4.5% increase for subsequent fiscal years); see also infra note 40 and
accompanying text.
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Further revisions were proposed by the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).' 2
While the "sea wars" dilemma is a modern creation stem-
ming from recent technological advances, the origins of the
conflict can be traced to the ancient tradition of federal-state
rivalry.' 3 Unfortunately, the promise contained in the Reagan
administration's plan' 4 to implement the New Federalism has not
been extended to OCS activities.' 5 Unless a cooperative relation-
ship between the federal government and the coastal states is
developed, litigation and controversy over the exploitation of
the OCS resources will continue.
I. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
An understanding of the statutory history of OCS develop-
ment is essential when evaluating the potential for resolution of
the "sea wars." The OCS doctrine that began with the Truman
Proclamation was later formalized by the 1958 Geneva Conven-
tion on the Continental Shelf.' 6 A series of important legislation
followed including the Submerged Lands Act of 1953,17 the
,2 50 Fed. Reg. 3798 (1985) (the goal of the NOAA's proposed new regulations
is to clarify the effect of the Supreme Court's.decision); 15 C.F.R. § 923.2(b) (1981) (NOAA
is the administrative agency delegated by the Secretary of Commerce to administer the
CZMA).
1 See generally Comment, Supreme Court Beaches Coastal Zone Management
Act, 14 ENVTL. L. RaP. (ENvrL. L. INST.) 10161 (Apr. 1984) (analysis of the implications
and reactions to Secretary of the Interior).
4 See Berger & Saurenman, The Role of Coastal States in Outer Continental
Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing: A Litigation Perspective, 3 VA. J. NAT. RESOUtRcES 35, 66-67
(Spring 1983).
" The objective of the New Federalism is the delegation of certain regulatory
functions to state and local government. See Harvey, Federal Consistency and Outer
Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development: A Review and Assessment of the "Directly
Affecting" Controversy, 13 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 481, 514 (1983-84).
'1 Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S.
No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (effective June 10, 1964).
" Ch. 65, 67 Stat. 29 (1953) (current version at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15, (1982)). See
generally Guste, Jr. & Ellis, Louisiana Tidelands Past and Future 21 Loy. L. REv. 817
(1975) (analysis of the Submerged Lands Act and the Louisiana Tidelands); Lewis, A
Capsule History and the Present Status of the Tidelands, Controversy, 3 NAT. RESOURCES
L. 620 (1970) (discussion of administrative actions and judicial rulings following passage
of the Submerged Lands Act).
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Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 (OCSLA),18 the
Outer Continental Land Act Amendments of 1978, 9 the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) ° and the
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA).
2
1
Congress adopted the Submerged Lands Act in response to
the controversial Supreme Court decision in United States v.
California, where the Supreme Court held that, in the interests
of national security, the federal government, and not the states,
had paramount rights in the natural resources of the OCS.
22
Congress rejected the Supreme Court's decision by enacting the
Submerged Lands Act which granted the states ownership and
proprietary rights under waters within three miles of their shores.
23
While the Submerged Lands Act granted the states control
over a portion of the coastal waters, it failed to authorize federal
oil and gas leasing on the OCS. For this reason, concomitant
with the passage of the Submerged Lands Act, the OCSLA was
enacted to authorize federal leasing of the OCS.2 4 Under the
OCSLA, the Secretary of the Interior was given broad discretion
to operate the leasing process with a minimum of policy guid-
ance.
25
The Santa Barbara blowout in 1969 heightened the awareness
of environmentalists, coastal states and fishermen to the risks
of unfettered OCS development by the Interior.16 These same
groups also expressed concern about the Interior's recent accel-
Ch. 345, § 2, 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-
1356 (1982)). See generally Christopher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Key
to a New Frontier, 6 STAN. L. REv. 23 (1953) (legislative history of OCSLA).
11 Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 632 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-
1356 (1982)).
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (Supp. 1981).
Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972) (codified as amended as 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1451-1464 (1982)).
22 332 U.S. 19 (1947) (current reactions to the Supreme Court's decision in Secretary
of Interior present a similar situation).
43 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1312 (1964).
14 Jones, The Legal Framework for Energy Development on the Outer Continental
Shelf, 10 U.C.L.A. [UCLA]-ALAsKA L. REV. 143, 152 (1981).
23 Id. at 153.
26 The Santa Barbara spill was the largest oil spill in United States history at the
time. See generally Walmsley, Oil Pollution Problems Arising Out of Exploitation of
the Continental Shelf; The Santa Barbara Disaster, 9 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 514
(1972) (discussion of the legal, political and economic considerations of the disaster).
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eration of the OCS lease schedule. 27 However, coastal states were
unsuccessful in their attempt to protect state lands from ex-
panded federal encroachment because the OCSLA had neglected
to provide the states with any formal decision-making powers.
28
In response to the states' interests, Congress developed amend-
ments to the OCSLA to:
achieve a balance between the need for expedited development
in the OCS and protection of the coastal environment. In its
attempt to combine these seemingly incompatible national pol-
icies, Congress placed balancing mechanisms in the act so that
governmental officials can balance environmental and energy
factors in their decision-making responsibilities.
29
The OCSLA amendments authorized the Interior to lease
land for offshore oil and gas production. In theory, the amend-
ments were promulgated to serve national energy needs and to
generate revenue from OCS lease sales. ° In practice, implemen-
tation of the amendments continued to conflict with the empha-
sis state agencies' placed on environmental protection in their
coastal zone management plans."
While the CZMA acts as the coastal states' charter for the
protection of the environment, the NEPA serves as the national
equivalent. The NEPA requires an Environmental Impact State-
ment (EIS) to be prepared for all proposed "major federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the environment.
3 2
The Interior used the EIS to determine if an OCS lease sale
17 H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1460. The lease schedule acceleration was the Interior's
response to the Arab oil boycott of 1973-74 and to the demands of the Reagan admin-
istration for increased domestic energy production.
28 Id. at 54.
2' Jones, supra note 24, at 167 (emphasis added); see Heller, The Federal Outer
Continental Shelf Leasing Program, 11 NAT. RESOURCES L. 66 (1979) (for further dis-
cussion of the OCSLA Amendments).
- Yi, Application of the Coastal Zone Management Act to Outer Continental
Shelf Lease Sales, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 159, 161 (1982).
I1 d.
32 Jones, supra note 24, at 168 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (Supp. 1981)). See
generally McDermott, Expanded Offshore Leasing and the Mandates of the Demise of
NEPA, 10 NAT. RESOURCES L. 531 (1977).
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should be held or if specific tracts should be deleted to avoid
environmental damage.33
An EIS is mandated at three Slages of the leasing process in
order to strike the appropriate balance between environmental
risks and economic benefits.3 4 The first EIS was prepared during
Nixon's tenure to determine the impact of accelerated leasing
promoted by Project Independence.3 5 Prior to every lease sale,
a second, general EIS is conducted because specific tracts have
not yet been selected.36 Development and production cannot be
initiated until a third EIS is undertaken on particular leased
tracts. Some experts believe the EIS significantly delays devel-
opment of the OCS while others have found regulatory delays
caused by the EIS to be minimal.3"
Although one commentator stated that the NEPA had be-
come the "major vehicle" for states to challenge federal OCS
leasing,38 the CZMA was enacted in 1972 primarily to give states
a role in the decision-making process of offshore leasing.39 Con-
gress offered federal grants4° and the promise of greater state
influence as incentives for states to participate in the develop-
ment of state coastal zone management programs. 41 Before re-
ceiving these benefits, the state is required to prepare a
" Jones, supra note 24, at 168.
[ d.
' Id. The first EIS, known as the programmatic environmental impact statement
(PEIS) was conducted in 1975 to determine the environmental impact of such a major
program and will not be repeated unless federal OCS leasing changes significantly. For
further discussion, see generally Grayson & Canaday, Issues of Competition on the Outer
Continental Shelf, 3 VA. J. NAT. REsOuRCES L. 69, 75-77 (1983); Comment, infra note 38.
See Jones, supra note 24, at 168.
" Id. at 169 (preparation of the EIS takes approximately eight or nine months).
1 Comment, Prospects for Increased State and Public Control over Outer Conti-
nental Shelf Leasing: The Timing of the Environmental Impact Statement, 21 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 709, 726 (1984).
3t See 16 U.S.C. § 1451(i) (1982). See generally Rubin, The Role of the Coastal
Zone Management Act of 1972 in the Development of Oil and Gas from the Outer
Continental Shelf, 8 NAT. RESOUtCES L. 399 (1975) (discussion of national interest in
prompt exploration and development of the OCS).
40 16 U.S.C. § 1455a(b) (1982); see also 130 CONG. Rc. E1592 (daily ed. Apr. 18,
1985) (statement of Rep. Shumway); 16 U.S.C. § 1455a(d)(1) (1982) (the federal govern-
ment has traditionally provided eighty percent of the funding for development and
operation of state coastal zone management plans).
' 16 U.S.C. § 1452 (1982).
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comprehensive coastal zone land use plan which must be ap-
proved by the Secretary of Commerce. 42 Approval of the plan
depends upon a finding by the Secretary that the state has
adequately balanced national energy needs with local interests.
43
The major incentive for states to participate in the coastal
zone management program are the consistency provisions of the
CZMA." Section 307(c)(1) provides that once a state CZMA
plan has been approved: "each Federal agency conducting or
supporting activities directly affecting the coastal zone shall con-
duct or support those activities in a manner which is, to the
maximum extent practicable, consistent with approved state
management programs. ' 45 Activities which are subject to a fed-
eral consistency determination are:
(1) those activities conducted or supported by a federal agency
which directly affect the coastal zone; (2) development projects
undertaken by federal agencies in the coastal zone; (3) OCS
post-lease sale activities which require a federal license or
permit; and (4) plans submitted by any person to the Secretary
of the Interior for the exploration or development of, or
production from any area leased under OCSLA when the
planned activity affects any land or water use in the coastal
zone.4
Uncertainty as to whether federal offshore lease sales are
subject to a consistency determination is one limitation on a
state's influence in offshore leasing. Another limitation is the
Interior's unilateral power to decide if a consistency determina-
tion is required by section 307 of the CZMA and the ineffec-
tiveness of a state's objection to a consistency determination.
4 7
Such restrictions on a participating state's powers, particularly
in light of the Reagan administration's emphasis on delegation
of responsibility to the states, have contributed substantially to
the present controversy.
4 s
" 16 U.S.C. § 1454(h) (1982).
43 See 16 U.S.C. § 1455(c)(8) (1982).
" 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (1982). Regulations implementing the consistency require-
ments are codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.1-930.145 (1981).
4 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1) (1982).
4 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c), (d) (1982).
" Comment, supra note 38, at 716, n. 67.
41 Harvey, supra note 15, at 514.
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II. SECRETARY OF THE IN2ERIOR V. CALIFORNIA
Former Secretary of the Interior James Watt planned to lease
almost the entire OCS49 between 1982-86. As a result, the coastal
states most likely to suffer the negative impacts from the pro-
gram sought a larger role in the decision-making process.5 0 One
situation representative of this conflict occurred off the Califor-
nia coast and involved lease sales 48, 53 and 68. Prior to each
lease sale, the California Coastal Commission, relying on section
307(c)(1) of the CZMA, requested that the Interior determine
whether the sale was consistent with the California Coastal Manage-
ment Plan. The Department refused to conduct a consistency deter-
mination on the grounds that the OCS lease sale did not directly
affect the California coastal zone and that the governor's request
to delete certain tracts failed to strike a reasonable balance
between national and local interests.'
The Interior then issued a final notice of sale,52 which
prompted California to file suit to enjoin the lease sale. The
District Court concluded that the final notice of sale would
directly affect the coastal zone "in all but the most unusual
case-a case that could only be posed as a hypothetical." 3 The
Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court's decision, but was re-
versed by the Supreme Court in Secretary of the Interior v.
California. 5 4
"' Grayson & Canaday, supra note 35, at 99 (about one billion OCS acres).
10 Comment, supra note 38, at 710.
' Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 318 (1984); see also 30 C.F.R.
§ 256.31 (1985). Within 60 days after notice of a proposed lease sale the Governor may
submit recommendations to the Secretary regarding the size, timing or location of the
proposed lease sale. The Secretary shall accept such recommendations if he determilies
they provide for a reasonable balance between national and local interests. The purpose
of the Act is looked at in order to ascertain the national interest. Id.
" 30 C.F.R. § 256.32 (1985) (a notice of sale, upon approval by the Secretary.
shall be published in the Federal Register at least 30 days prior to sale and include a
description of areas offered for sale, the stipulations, terms and conditions of the sale).
s California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359. 1380 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
, State of California, Etc. v. Watt. 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom.
Secretary of Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984) (the Interior is not compelled to
disapprove a federal activity in the face of a state's objection).
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The major issue the Supreme Court addressed was whether
the Interior's actions "directly affect[ed]" the California coastal
zone when it sold oil and gas leases immediately adjacent to
California's coastal zone." First, the Court held that section
307(c)(1) of the CZMA applied only to activities within the
coastal zone itself or in a federal enclave within the coastal zone
and was not applicable to activities on the OCS.56 Second, the
Court emphasized that even if section 307(c)(1) applied to the
sale of OCS oil leases, the OCSLA amendments only entitled
the purchaser to conduct very limited "preliminary activities"
on the OCS. In the Court's opinion, preliminary activities as-
sociated with a lease sale did not trigger consistency review
because the effect on the coastal zone was not direct."7
A comparison of the majority and dissenting opinions reveals
how the plain meaning of the term "directly affecting," the
legislative history of the CZMA and OCSLA, the purpose of
the CZMA and OCSLA amendments, and OCSLA policy ar-
guments all can be interpreted in different ways to reach a
desired result.
A. The Plain Meaning
The majority found that the meaning of the term "directly
affecting" as used in section 307(c)(1) had not been defined
anywhere in the CZMA.5 8 The court stated that the "alternative
verbal formulations" proposed by each party were superficially
plausible but were without support in the Act itself.5 9 The dissent
cited rules of statutory construction in support of its finding
that "directly affecting" should be defined to apply to activities
that occurred outside as well as inside the coastal zone. 60
Secretary of Interior, 464 U.S. at 344 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
I d. at 322.
17 Id.
11 Id. at 321-22.
51 Interior defined the term to mean having a direct, identifiable impact on the coastal
zone. 464 U.S. at 321 (citing Brief for Federal Petitioners 20). California construed the
phrase as initiating a series of events of coastal management consequence. Id. at 321
(citing Brief for Respondent 10).
"I Secretary of Interior, 464 U.S. at 321.
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B. Legislative History
The dissent found additional support in the legislative history
of the CZMA for its position that the sale of OCS leases is an
activity "directly affecting" the coastal zone within the meaning
of section 307(c)(1). Although the original House and Senate
versions of the CZMA applied only to activities "in the coastal
zone," the purpose of the CZMA was to prevent adverse effects
on the zone.6' This purpose could not have been effectuated
without considering the impact activities conducted outside the
coastal zone would have had on the coastal zone. 6 Therefore, the
replacement of "in the coastal zone" with "directly affecting
the coastal zone" expanded the scope of the consistency
obligation 63 to any federal activity which had an effect in the
coastal zone.64
The majority's explanation for the substitution of the words
"directly affecting" for "in the coastal zone" rested in the
different definitions of "coastal zone" contained in the original
House and Senate bills. 65 The Senate definition of "coastal
zone" excluded federal lands within the coastal zone from com-
pliance with state management plans. In contrast, the House bill
interpreted federal lands to be "fully subject to section 307(c)(1)'s
consistency requirement. '" However, neither bill included fed-
eral lands in the OCS in its definition of coastal zone. As a
result, the majority concluded that federal activities in the OCS
, Id. at 345-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Caminetti v. United States. 242 U.S.
470, 485-86 (1917) (stating the plain meaning rule of statutory construction which provides
that "[s]tatutory words are uniformly presumed, unless the contrary appears, to be used
in their ordinary and usual sense, and with the meaning commonly attributed to them").
62 Secretary of Interior, 464 U.S. at 347 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see H.R. 14146,
92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 118 CONG. REc. 26502 (1972); S. 3507, 92d Cong. 2d
Sess. § 314(b)(1) (1972) reprinted in 118 CONG. REc. 14190 (1972); see also 16 U.S.C.
§ 1452(1) (1982) (the expressed purpose of the CZMA was to promote the preservation of
natural resources in the coastal zone).
11 Secretary of Interior, 464 U.S. at 347 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "An oil well
adjacent to the zone will affect the zone in precisely the same way whether it is in a
federal enclave or in federal water just outside the zone." Id. at 348 n.6.
" Id. at 346-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (this expansion meant that if any activity
outside tne zone has an effect in the zone then that activity is subject to the consistency
provision of § 307(c)(1)).
Id. at 322; see supra note 61.
Secretary of Interior, 464 U.S. at 323.
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were excluded from 307(c)(1)'s consistency provisions. 67 More-
over, provisions which would have enabled the state to play a
crucial role in requiring federal OCS leasing to be consistent
with state management programs were rejected by Congress as
likely to create conflicts with existing continental shelf legisla-
tion. 68 The Court felt compelled to conclude that the "directly
affecting" language of section 307(c)(1) applied only to federal
lands within the coastal zone and not to OCS lease sales.
69
The final legislative history argument used by the Court to
show that section 307(c)(1) did not apply to OCS leasing involved
an analysis of other paragraphs of the CZMA. 70 The Court
decided that section 307(3) is more relevant to the sale of OCS
leases. 71 Upon examination, the Court concluded that the legis-
lative history of section 307(c)(3) did not require a consistency
determination for OCS lease sales.72
C. The Purpose of the CZMA
The purpose of the CZMA reinforced the minority's position
that under section 307(c)(1) federal OCS activity was subject to
a consistency review at the lease sale stage. Several provisions
of the CZMA "indicate a preference for long range planning
' Id.
6I Id. at 327; see H.R. CON. REP. No. 1544, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in
1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4825.
" Secretary of Interior, 464 U.S. at 330.
70 Id. at 332. (the majority found § 307(c)(1) inapplicable to OCS lease sales because
hydrocarbon drilling on the OCS is not an activity "conduct[ed] or support[ed]" by a
federal agency).
1' Id. at 333. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(b) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
[Any person who submits to the Secretary of the Interior any plan for
the exploration or development of, or production from, any area which
has been leased under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act .. . shall
with respect to any exploration, development, or production described in
such plan and affecting any land use or water use in the coastal zone...
[certify] that each activity .. . complies with [the] state's approved man-
agement program .... No Federal official or agency shall grant such
person any license or permit for any activity .. .until [the state concurs
or ] . . . the Secretary finds .. . that each activity .. .is consistent with
the objectives of [CZMAJ or is otherwise necessary in the interest of
national security.
'" Id.; see H.R. CON. REP. No. 1298, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEWS 1768, 1827-28.
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and for close cooperation between federal and state agencies in
conducting or supporting activities that directly affect the coastal
zone."" Application of the consistency requirement at the lease
sale stage would fulfill this purpose74 and promote more efficient
development of the OCS. For example, reassurance at the pre-
lease stage that a lessee's plans were consistent with the state's
management plan would save time and money for the lessee, the
public and the government.
7
In addition, if OCS lease sales by the federal government
were not subject to the consistency provisions, congressional
intent to ensure a consistency determination of federal activities
would be completely circumvented. 76 This conclusion was ines-
capable because the only federal activity in the development of
the OCS occurred at the lease sale stage as all subsequent activ-
ities were conducted by lessees. 77 The majority found that "broad
arguments about CZMA's structure, the Act's incentives for the
development of state management programs, and the Act's gen-
eral aspirations for state/federal cooperation cannot support the
expansive reading of section 307(c)(1).
' 78
D. The CZMA Amendments
Although section 307(c)(3) was amended in 1976, House and
Senate proposals to add the word "lease" in order to require
consistency for lease sales, were rejected by Congress. 79 The
majority further noted that section 307(c)(3)(B) as amended pro-
vided that only applicants for federal licenses or permits must
certify consistency with state plans before exploration or pro-
duction.8 0 Since lease sales were not included in the express
" Secretary of Interior, 464 U.S. at 356 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra note 61
and accompanying text.
, Secretary of Interior, 464 U.S. at 357 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 357-58. For further discussion, see Yi, supra note 30, at 182-83; Note,
Watt v. California: Supreme Court Sinks Consistency Review of Offshore Oil Leases,
10 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 131. 141 (1985).
'6 Secretary of Interior, 464 U.S. at 359 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" Id.; see also Berger and Saurenman, supra note 14, at 48.
'9 Secretary of Interior, 464 U.S. at 332.
Id. at 334-35.
Id.; see supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
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consistency clause of section 307(c)(3)(B), the court concluded
that a determination is not required when a lease is sold.8'
The dissent detailed a "dramatically different congressional
understanding" of the deletion of the term "lease" from the
proposed amendments. 2 The legislative history indicated that the
word "lease" was omitted "not because of disagreement with
the concept of applying section 307 to OCS leasing, but because
the conferees saw no reason to amend section 307(c)(3) since
there was widespread agreement in 1976 that section 307(c)(3)(1)
already applied to OCS leasing." 3 The addition of section
307(c)(3)(B) was meant to extend the consistency requirement
from the lease-bid stage to subsequent steps84 involving produc-
tion or development.
E. The 1978 OCSLA Amendments
The 1978 Amendments to the OCSLA fragmented the OCS
leasing process into four distinct steps. The four stages were
planning, lease sales, exploration and production. 5 The majority
decided that the first two steps of the leasing process involved
some consultation with the states. However, a consistency deter-
mination with state coastal management plans was not mandated
by the Amendments until the last two steps.8 6
The Court found that since the Amendments required federal
approval prior to exploration or development by OCS lessees,
the mere sale of a lease did not involve the consistency require-
ment of section 307(c)(1) of the CZMA.17 Moreover, the sale of
a lease did not directly affect the coastal zone because a lease
was subject to cancellation if it failed to meet with federal
approval.8 s The majority rationalized the distinction between the
four stages on policy grounds, asserting that Congress had de-
" Secretary of Interior, 464 U.S. at 335.
2 Id. at 364 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" H.R. REP. No. 878, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1976).
'" Id.; see H.R. CoN. REP. No. 1298, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1828.
- 43 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1337(a), 1340, 1351 (1982).
86 Id. at 1340(c)(1), 1351(d).
'7 Secretary of Interior, 464 U.S. at 338.
" Id. 339; see Yi, supra note 30, at 182-83 (discussing problems with this approach).
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cided it was better to postpone consistency requirements until
further information on specific tracts was available.89
Four arguments raised by Justice Stevens' dissent evidenced
legislative intent to require a consistency determination pursuant
to the CZMA at the leasing stage. First, there was an explicit
savings clause in the OCSLA amendments to preserve the pro-
visions of the CZMA. 90 Second, the only House report made
during consideration of the OCSLA amendments required a
consistency review of OCS leasing. 9' Third, section 18(f) of the
OCSLA provided that state management plans must be consid-
ered by the Secretary at the leasing stage. 92 Fourth, a lease sale
did not have an indirect effect, because the natural consequence
of selling a lease was development."' As the Ninth Circuit stated:
[Diecisions made at the lease sale stage establish the basic
scope and charter for subsequent development and production.
Prior to the sale of leases, critical decisions are made as to the
size and location of the tracts, the timing of the sale, and the
stipulations to which the leases would be subject. These choices
determine, or at least influence, whether oil will be transported
by pipeline or ship, which areas of the coastal zone will be
exposed to danger, the flow of vessel traffic, and the siting of
onshore construction.94
The dissent agreed with the Ninth Circuit that leasing sets into
motion a chain of events resulting in development directly af-
fecting the coastal zone. 95
19 Secretary of Interior, 464 U.S. at 342-43; see Berger & Saurenman, supra note
14, at 47-48.
1, Secretary of Interior, 464 U.S. at 372 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 43 U.S.C. § 1866(a)
(1982) provides that: "Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Charter, nothing
in this chapter shall be construed to amend, modify or repeal any provision of the Coastal
Zone Management Act of 1972 .... "
" Secretary of Interior, 464 U.S. at 373 (Stevens, J., dissenting); H.R. REP. 590,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 153, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. NEws 1559 n. 52.
11 43 U.S.C. § 1344(f) (1982); Secretary of Interior, 464 U.S. at 372 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
91 Secretary of Interior, 464 U.S. at 372 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253, 1289.
11 Secretary of Interior, 464 U.S. at 364 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Ill. RAMIFICATIONS OF SECRETARY OF
THE INTERIOR V. CALIFORNIA
The majority of the Supreme Court held that the Interior's
sale of OCS oil and gas leases was not an activity which directly
affected the coastal zone and as a result lease sales did not
trigger the consistency provisions of section 307(c)(1) of the
CZMA. Since a consistency review was not required, the Court
decided it was not necessary to define the terms "directly af-
fecting" and "to the maximum extent practicable." 9 Despite
the Supreme Court's cursory treatment of this statutory lan-
guage, Congress plans to retain and clarify these terms with
more concise language in the proposed amendments to the
CZMA. 97
The Court's restrictive interpretation of the scope of the
CZMA consistency provisions seriously eroded the ability of the
states to influence pre-lease and lease sale activities on the OCS.
98
After Secretary of the Interior, the only activities clearly subject
to a state consistency determination were federal activities in the
coastal zone which affected the zone. Prior to the majority's
decision, "the threshold for a consistency determination under
section 307(c)(1) had been a function of the extent to which a
Federal activity affects the coastal zone, not of the activity's
geographic location."99
The territorial restrictions on the scope of the CZMA man-
dated by the Court's decision affected other activities which
occured outside the coastal zone. For instance, one company
filed a memo with the NOAA contending that its permit appli-
cation to incinerate hazardous waste outside the coastal zone did
not trigger state consistency review under the CZMA. I°° It is
also unclear whether the Interior's plans to lease ocean mining
tracts in the Pacific Northwest are subject to a state consistency
determination. °'0 The decision will affect the ability of states to
respond to activities such as ocean dumping of radioactive wastes,
" Id. at 342-43; see Comment, supra note 13, at 10166.
"0 See infra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
" Id.; see Comment, supra note 38, at 728-30 (for further discussion).
91 130 CoNo. Rc. 48 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1984) (statement of Rep. Ranetta).
100 130 CoNG. REc. E31 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1984) (statement of Rep. D'Amours).
,,, 130 CONG. Rc. S1506 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood).
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regulation of coastal pollution, and the siting of energy facili-
ties. 102
In addition, the geographic limitations imposed on the scope
of the CZMA by the majority's position may detrimentally affect
certain activities which necessarily transgress state lines and occur
within the coastal zone. The management of marine fishery
resources by a regional council pursuant to the Magnuson Fish-
ery Conservation and Management Act'03 is one such activity.
Mandatory state review may undermine the regional concept
embodied in the program.104 For this reason, the proposed Senate
version of section 307(c)(1) would exclude activities pursuant to
this act from consistency review. 05
Another ramification of the court's holding has been the
increased utilization by coastal states of the moratoria mecha-
nism to prevent federal OCS leasing of potentially environmen-
tally sensitive tracts.10 6 A congressionally-imposed lease
moratorium is a viable alternative to the protection offered by
the consistency provisions of the CZMA. However, the placing
of OCS acres in moratoria is effective for a limited period. For
example, while drilling bans have been renewed off the coast of
such controversial states as California and Massachusetts, a ban
off the Gulf Coast of Florida has been allowed to lapse and the
House Appropriation Committee has decided not to prohibit
drilling off Alaska's Bristol Bay.
10 7
The Court's opinion had some positive effects, such as lim-
iting the rights of lessees to conduct only preliminary activities
until a consistency determination has been made, and strength-
ening the review provisions of section 307(c)(3) so that consist-
ency is mandatory at the exploration stage. '8 A permit or licensing
130 Cong. Rec. E30 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1984) (statement of Rep. D'Amours).
103 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1982).
130 CONG. Rc. S1506 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1984) (statement of Rep. Packwood).
S. 2324(c)(1)(a)(iv), 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. 1506-07 (1984); see
130 CONG. REc. S1507 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
106 130 CONG. Rc. E1460 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1984) (statement of Rep. Jack Fields
quoting Threet, OCS Moratoriums Harm Nation's Best Energy Hope (prior to 1982, 736,000
acres were placed in moratoria; however, between 1982-84 alone, 52 million acres were
placed in mortoria).
0* 130 CONG. REc. S9255 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Sen. Goldwater).
See Secretary of Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, at 339-43 (1984).
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agency now has the affirmative obligation to insist that licensees
meet state consistency requirements. Finally, any leases which
do not comply with a state's plan may be cancelled at the
discretion of the Interior. 1°9
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
The effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Secretary of
the Interior is analogous to that of a pebble thrown into a pond.
Although the pebble has long since touched the bottom, the
ripples continue to expand. The greatest ripples or ramifications
flowing from the Court's holding are the varying responses of
the Interior, the NOAA and Congress.
In 1983, former Secretary of the Interior James Watt adopted
the controversial area-wide leasing program. Area-wide leasing
replaced the traditional nomination or tract by tract system and
reflected the Reagan administration's aggressive approach to
offshore leasing."10 Although Watt's successor, William Clark,
refused to discontinue area-wide leasing, he did adhere to the
position that the "[d]epartment [would] try to identify the pre-
cise areas of interest to allow earlier assessment of environmental
and coastal impacts, and [would] give the states earlier no-
tice." 2" The area-wide leasing policy has been further tempered,"
by the latest Secretary of the Interior, George Hodel."13
There is no doubt that the Interior will have to make more
compromises between the goals of area-wide leasing and the
deletion of environmentally sensitive tracts. One oil company
spokesman explained that fewer companies were bidding because
"sales became less and less attractive as [the] Interior steadily
snipped out tracts of interest to the Navy, environmentalists and
Id. at 333-34.
" 47 Fed. Reg. 11,980, 11,982 (1982); see Grayson, supra note 49, at 74-77 (for
a discussion of areawide leasing).
Comment, supra note 13, at 10168.
131 CONG. REc. S1 141 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1985) (George Hodel was confirmed by
the Senate as Secretary of the Interior, replacing William Clark on February 6, 1985).
"1 130 CONG. REc. H5834 (daily ed. July 17, 1985) (remarks of Rep. Panetta) (Discuss-
ing a preliminary agreement reached between the Secretary and representatives of Califor-
ia releasing 150 tracts of the 6,460 in moratoria to be offered for leasing. The remaining
tracts would be protected until the year 2,000 except in event of a national emergency.).
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fishing interests [until] many, if not most of the interesting tracts
were deleted.
'" 14
The NOAA proposed a new rulemaking limited to modifi-
cations necessitated by the Supreme Court's decision." 5 The most
significant change was that oil and gas lease sales were to be
excluded from the list of activities subject to state and federal
CZMA consistency requirements." 16 In addition, the NOAA has
conducted a Federal Consistency Study which documented the
experiences of states, federal agencies, industry and public inter-
est groups in implementing the federal consistency provisions."
7
The results of the study enabled the NOAA to "decide which
issues will need to be addressed in future rulemakings; which
requires legislative remedies, possibly as part of the Congres-
sional reauthorization process for the CZMA scheduled for 1985;
and which do not require revision.""'
Not only is the CZMA to be reauthorized in 1985 but both
Houses of Congress felt compelled to propose legislation which
would allow states to voice concerns over the impact of a wide
range of federally sponsored activities upon their coastline." 9
" 130 CONG. REc. H10908, H10909 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Panetta). Similarly, not a single bid was submitted for the Georges Bank sale off the
coast of Massachusetts, 130 CONG. REc. E4437 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984) (statement of
Rep. Markey).
"I The Court dismissed the legislative history of regulations promulgated by the
NOAA in its administration of the CZMA, stating the agency has walked a path of
such "tortured vacillation and indecision" in its interpretation of § 307(c)(1) that the
regulations were of no help. Secretary of the Interior, 464 U.S. at 320 n.6.
Although NOAA has recently prevaricated on whether lease sales directly affected
the coastal zone and thereby triggered a consistency determination, prior to 1981,
NOAA's long-held opinion was that pre-leasing activities were subject to a consistency
review. California v. Watt, 683 F.2d at 1261.
50 Fed. Reg. 3,800 (1985).
50 Fed. Reg. 18,546 (1985). Sections I & II of the Draft Federal Consistency
Study summarize the statistical information on the use of the Federal consistency process
to review Federal activities, licenses and permits, and funding assistance during fiscal
year 1983. Section III looks at the operation of the Federal consistency process including:
"(1) interpreting the language of the CZMA; (2) achieving improved consultation and
coordination through consistency; (3) conducting a consistency review; (4) reaching
agreements on the consistency of an activity; and (5) using formal mechanisms to help
resolve disagreements between Federal and State agencies". Id.
50 Fed. Reg. 3,800 (1985).
130 CONG. REc. H8 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1984) (statement of Rep. Panetta); 130
CONG. REc. S1506 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood).
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The purpose of H.R. 4589 is to clarify Section 307(c)(1) and to
effectuate the intent of the CZMA. This would ensure that states
and localities are involved in decisions affecting the coastal
zone. 120
First, paragraph (A) removes the geographic limitation of
federal activities "in the coastal zone" by explicitly stating that
activities "whether within or landward, or seaward of, the coastal
zone" which affect the coastal zone must be consistent with state
programs "to the maximum extent practicable."'' House dis-
cussion of the bill clarifies the phrase "to the maximum extent
practicable." The term is defined as it currently appears in
Commerce Department regulations.
22
Second, paragraph (B) specifically lists activities which di-
rectly affect the coastal zone beginning with activities requiring
conduct or support which "(i) produces identifiable physical,
biological, social or economic consequences in the coastal
zone."'' 2  If the first provision does not cover an activity, the
second provision may trigger a consistency review if the activity
"(ii) initiates a chain of events likely to result in any such
consequences."
24
Third, paragraph (C) excludes activities from a consistency
determination if prohibited by Federal law or an unforeseen
circumstance. 2 The latter exclusion may become a point of
contention, if it is interpreted broadly.' 26 This paragraph also
provides that activities directly affecting the coastal zone shall
be conducted in a manner "fully consistent" with approved
management programs.' 27 It is difficult to foresee whether the
"fully consistent" standard will fare any better than the contro-
versial "to the maximum extent practicable" standard.
Senate Bill 2324 parallels the House amendment by clearly
requiring offshore oil and gas leasing by the Interior to be
20 130 CONG. REc. H20-21 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1984) (statement of Rep. Levine).
H.R. 4589(c)(1)(A), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) amending 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)
(1982).
2' 130 CONG. REc. H8 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1984) (remarks of Rep. Panetta).
21 H.R. 4589(c)(1), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
IN Id.
Id. at H.R. 4589(c)(l)(i), (ii).
For example, this exclusion may encompass an event such as another Arab oil
embargo.
I" H.R. 4589(c)(1)(c), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
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consistent with state coastal management plans. 121 Paragraph (A)
replaces "directly affecting" with "significantly affecting" the
coastal zone. "Significantly affecting" may create the same sta-
tutory construction problems as "directly affecting" unless the
new term is clearly defined. The Senate replaced the phrase "to
the maximum extent practicable" with the obligation that federal
activities be "fully consistent" with state management plans.'
29
A precise definition of this term may succeed in eliminating one
source of potential conflict. Activities excluded from a consist-
ency determination under the Senate's plan include those which
involve questions of national security, national emergency, con-
flicts with Federal law, and any activities pursuant to the Mag-
nuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act.'30
The outraged reaction of Congress to the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the CZMA can be appreciated by examining
the proposed amendments as well as the comments of an original
author of the CZMA, Senator Hollings:
With the pen strokes of the majority opinion suddenly we are
being told that a Federal-State relationship founded over 10
years ago in this legislation is not at all what the Congress and
the States believed it to be. And in the place of this established
partnership we now have a simple-minded description for which
there is no basis in legislative history or legislative context.
What the Court has done is freed the Department of Interior
of its duty to review offshore oil and gas leasing plans for
consistency with the CZMA plans of adjacent states, while this
duty is exactly what Congress intended to impose in this pro-
vision of law.' 3'
Senator Hollings' attitude is prevalent among members of
Congress, environmental groups and coastal states, but certainly
"I See 130 CONG. REc. S1506 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1984) (statement of Senator
Packwood).
1-1 S. 2324(c)(1)(A), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), amending 16 U.S.C. §
1456(c)(1) (1982).
0 S. 2324(c)(1)(a)(i)-(iv) (1984). There could be a danger that the national security
exclusion could be interpreted broadly. For example, the national security argument was
used by the federal government to invoke areawide leasing. See Grayson, supra note 35, at 99.
"' 130 CoNG. REc. S1507 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1984) (statement of Senator Hollings).
THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT
not among federal agencies and the oil industry. Such conflicting
interpretations of the applicability of the consistency require-
ments to offshore leasing do not bode well for the potential of
a cooperative federal/state partnership. Indeed, the passage of
the proposed amendments will meet with resistance from the
NOAA as "the bill has the potential to elevate coastal state
interests above national interests in OCS development."'
3 2
However, this fear that state decision-making will pre-empt
federal concerns has been addressed repeatedly by House and
Senate members. The proposed legislation does not give coastal
states veto power "de facto or otherwise" over federal activities
affecting the coastal zone. It merely gives states the right to
object to federal activities which affect the zone.'33
Conclusion
In conclusion, neither the CZMA nor the OCSLA amend-
ments were enacted to benefit exclusively state or federal inter-
ests. Each Act emphasized balancing national interests of efficient
energy production with coastal states' concerns regarding the
environmental impacts of offshore development. One factor in
the present polarization of state and federal interests can be
traced to the Interior's confrontational posture under former
Secretary of the Interior Watt in implementing the OCSLA
amendments. A second factor is the Interior's exclusion of coastal
states from sharing in the revenues generated by offshore oil
production.
Although former Secretary Watt has long since resigned, a
legacy of distrust of the federal government by coastal states
remains. Secretary Hodel has begun to moderate his predeces-
sor's approach to offshore leasing in his relations with the states.
For example, Secretary Hodel was recently praised for his efforts
to accommodate California's environmental interests when he
negotiated a lease moratorium agreement. 3 4 This is an encour-
132 Testimony on behalf of the Southeastern Fisheries Association, Inc., regarding
H.R. 4589 presented to the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the House Committee
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1984) (statement of Eldon V.
C. Greenberg).
'3 See CONG. REc. H8 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1984) (remarks of Rep. Panetta).
,14 See CONG. REc. H5765, H5766 (daily ed. July 17, 1985) (statement of Rep.
Bosco); see also supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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aging gesture toward the establishment of a cooperative federal/
state relationship.
Another step in the right direction would be to involve the
states in a revenue sharing plan which would compensate coastal
states for such OCS development risks as pollution and possible
boomtown effects of support facilities.'35 Legislation calling for
such a plan has been proposed in the event the CZMA amend-
ments are not adopted.'36 These funds would replace recom-
mended CZMA appropriation cuts and enable coastal states to
attain parity with inland states which traditionally have shared
in oil revenues. This approach would enable the states to imple-
ment a cost/benefit analysis which would involve weighing po-
tential negative environmental impacts with revenue generated
from offshore production.
37
Revenue sharing encourages states to work in concert with
the federal government in developing natural resources. A co-
operative federal/state relationship in OCS development would
reduce the lead time from lease bid to full lease production and
virtually eliminate time-consuming litigation. Although Secretary
of the Interior was intended to end the "vexatious litigation,"
it is only the opening volley of the "sea wars." A final "truce"
or cooperative partnership between federal and state govern-
ments will be established when a practical solution involving
moderation and revenue sharing is reached.
PAMELA L. SMILLIE
See Shirley, The Imperative for Offshore Development, THE POLITICS OF OFF-
SHORE OIL 173 (Goldstein ed. 1982) (for a general discussion of revenue sharing).
3 H.R. 5, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 800, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (allocating
a portion of federal OCS revenue to the states for continued management of coastal
resources).
" See Shirley, supra note 135.
